Monday, December 22, 2008

Crisis Averted

In May the Center on Education Policy (CEP) released a report looking at how states structured their Annual Measurable Objectives (AMOs). The No Child Left Behind Act required only that AMOs reach 100% by 2014 and that each increase must be equivalent, and it allowed states up to three years of no growth. It being 2002 at the time, about half the states chose to backload their AMOs, calling for no gains in the early years of the law, followed by steep increases each year leading into 2014. Depending on your cynicism, this was either to allow districts the opportunity to prepare for the new requirements or a way to force changes to the next generation of the federal education law.

The May CEP report warned of the impending consequences of such backloading:
Although states may have had logical reasons for choosing a backloaded approach, it appears that schools and districts in backloading states are likely to have more difficulty making AYP than in previous years, and the number of schools identified for NCLB improvement in these states might rise.
The numbers are now in ($) for 46 states and the District of Columbia, and it turns out the CEP report was wrong. Nationwide, 7.3 percent more schools failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) this year, for a total of 35.6 percent of all Title I schools. But, that increase was led by the states categorized by CEP as "incremental." While backloaded states averaged only a 3.2 percent increase, incremental states rose 7.7 percent. The percent of schools rated "in need of improvement" rose 2.1 percent for a total of 17.9. This too was led by states that were incremental in their AMOs.

These results suggest that Charlie Barone was right: the safe harbor provision is working. Safe harbor allows districts and schools to make AYP so long as they reduce by 10 percent the percentage of students in any sub-group not meeting proficiency targets. Backloading states are clearly benefiting from this provision (which Charlie dubbed the "poor man's growth model"), and this is entirely a good thing. The law's built-in flexibility is being put to work. The fear that 100 percent of schools will fail is not happening, and the sky remains intact.

Sunday, December 21, 2008

The Gladwell/ Kane Theory of Teacher Recruitment

Overheard: a business CEO will hire any Harvard MBA before they even begin the program. It isn't the education itself that makes them valuable employees, in this estimation, it's the screen that let them in that proves their quality. In education, it turns out all of our traditional screens, and even some untraditional ones, don't tell us much about how effective the incoming teacher will be.

In a recent report for the National Bureau of Economic Research, Jonah Rockoff, Brian Jacob, Thomas Kane, and Douglas Staiger look at a host of teacher recruit characteristics and analyze their ability to predict the teacher's effectiveness in the classroom based on these characteristics. The characteristics include some commonly studied ones like their SAT scores, whether the teacher passed their licensure test on the first try, their undergraduate major, and the selectivity of their undergraduate college. The list also included less commonly used measures like tests of cognitive and mathematic ability, conscientousness, extraversion, and efficacy. They also included a commercial screener used by several large urban districts.

The added information did lead to better predictions. But even with all these new variables on incoming teachers, the researchers could explain only 12 percent of the variance in teacher effectiveness. As they wrote, "This underscores the difficult, perhaps impossible, task of identifying systematically the most highly effective or ineffective teachers without any data on actual performance in the classroom."

The findings do not mean this difficult task is impossible (promising research out of Louisiana suggests that teacher preparation programs matter), but it does suggest we take the Malcolm Gladwell / Tom Kane theory of teacher recruitment more seriously. It means that, to get a higher quality teaching workforce, it isn't simply a matter of recruiting more talented, more efficacious, or more extraverted teachers. It means allowing more people to try their hand at the profession, intensively screening them while they're in the classroom, and then enacting salary and personnel policies to both keep them in the profession and keep them performing at a high level.

Unfortunately, we're much more willing to allow screens (really just educated guesses) at the moment of hiring than after the teacher has been in the job. One huge obstacle in basing personnel decisions on teacher effectiveness is being confident that value-added measures reflect actual value and not the effects of one bad class. Some excellent research by Dan Goldhaber and Michael Hansen tested the bad-apple theory in teacher value-added effectiveness. They used three years of data to rank teachers into five groups, and then asked what percent of teachers moved groups. In one dataset, 31 of 281 teachers placed in the bottom group in their students' growth in both math and reading. If we denied these teachers tenure, would we losing great teachers? Or ineffective ones, as the data would predict?

As the chart at left shows, the estimations were by no means perfect. The screen would eliminate some fair and even some very good teachers, but mostly (and this word is not comforting to teachers or their representatives) it screened out ineffective teachers. Mostly the teachers who were ineffective in their first three years were ineffective after.

The word "mostly" should not be reason to summarily dismiss the use of value-added teacher effectiveness scores in personnel decisions. Rather, it should be embraced as a good start, something to be combined with other evaluations, especially given new research suggesting good teaching cannot easily be screened at the hiring stage.